Secondly, the exercise of discretion under UCPR 171 varies according to which of the relevant paragraphs of that rule is in play. For example, if the court determines that a statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action it is determining that the facts pleaded are not capable in law of giving rise to the relief sought. Cases such as General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) show that even lengthy argument may be necessary to dispose of what is ultimately a question of law. This is not an application of that kind.
 On the other hand, where the problem is one of inadequate or inaccurate pleading which has a tendency to prejudice or delay a fair trial, or the pleading contains unnecessary or scandalous allegations or frivolous or vexatious allegations, or is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court, there tends to be a more general discretion. Nevertheless, the case law recognises that a pleading may be so defective notwithstanding earnest attempts by the pleader that “it will be an act of mercy” to strike it out. That is so, even though it is for the party pleading to formulate its case and the court’s role is primarily to consider whether a reasonable cause of action is disclosed, and to facilitate the just and expeditious resolution of the real issues rather than to dictate to a party a rigid manner in which a case should be pleaded. In summary, the courts are slow to interfere and ordinarily act only where there is some substantial objection or some real embarrassment.
David Cormack – Brisbane Barrister.